AG Kit uses calendar versioning. Security fixes are provided for the latest published release. Upgrade the CLI and toolkit before reporting an issue already fixed in a newer release.
Use GitHub private vulnerability reporting or the repository Security Advisory flow. Do not publish suspected secrets, exploitable command payloads, private paths, prompt contents, source code, or proof-of-concept data in a public issue.
Include only sanitized information:
- affected AG Kit, CLI, web, and
.agentsversions; - Antigravity build/channel and operating system;
- Node.js and Python versions;
- affected hook, MCP server, plugin file, agent, skill, workflow, CLI command, CI job, or deployment path;
- minimal reproduction steps with credentials and private data removed;
- expected impact, observed behavior, and known mitigations.
The Antigravity integration assumes prompts, repository content, tool arguments, MCP responses, and third-party dependencies may be untrusted.
Primary risks:
- prompt or repository instructions inducing unsafe tool use;
- destructive shell commands reaching a trusted host;
- secrets embedded in MCP configuration or logs;
- malicious or compromised MCP servers;
- plugin artifact tampering or stale generated content;
- local/global configuration conflict during synchronization;
- upstream hook-payload changes causing false blocks or workspace lockout;
- dependency or GitHub Actions supply-chain compromise.
AG Kit reduces these risks but is not a sandbox. Keep Antigravity permissions, workspace trust, operating-system isolation, least-privilege credentials, code review, and human approval enabled.
.agents/hooks.json registers a PreToolUse hook for run_command. The policy reads at most 1 MiB of JSON from stdin, performs no network request, and blocks only high-confidence patterns:
- recursive deletion of a Unix filesystem root;
- filesystem formatting commands;
- raw-disk overwrite with
dd; - Windows drive formatting;
- recursive forced deletion of a Windows drive root.
Normal project cleanup such as deleting dist/ or node_modules/ is intentionally allowed.
Recognized destructive commands fail closed with a non-zero exit code. Invalid JSON, oversized input, or an unrecognized payload shape fails open with a warning to avoid an upstream schema change locking every tool call. Treat such warnings as compatibility incidents and investigate before production use.
To temporarily disable only the AG Kit hook, set "enabled": false in .agents/hooks.json and reopen the workspace. Do not disable Antigravity's own permission controls. Report false positives and payload-shape changes privately when data may be sensitive.
.agents/mcp_config.json is an example workspace source and must not contain real credentials in version control.
sync-mcp.mjs:
- defaults to check-only behavior;
- refuses
--applywhile placeholders remain; - preserves same-name existing servers unless
--forceis explicitly supplied; - creates a timestamped backup before replacing an existing target file;
- writes only to the selected Antigravity suite or CLI target.
Review MCP server source, requested permissions, network destinations, and data-retention policy before enabling it. Prefer environment-based secret injection where supported. Rotate any credential that appears in a commit, log, artifact, issue, or chat transcript.
The plugin builder reads repository files only. It does not copy environment variables or home-directory configuration. Review the generated dist/antigravity-plugin/ directory and PLUGIN_CONTENTS.json before installation.
Do not install an artifact when:
- its version differs from
.agents/VERSION; - the content inventory is missing or unexpected;
- it contains a real MCP credential;
- it was generated from an unreviewed branch;
- required CI or Dependency Review checks failed.
ag-kit update uses a managed-file manifest and merge strategy by default. Local modifications are not silently overwritten. Conflicts produce an incoming copy and JSON report, while pre-update backups support ag-kit rollback.
Global MCP synchronization has a separate timestamped backup and must be restored separately when rolling back the toolkit.
The repository expects:
- immutable commit-SHA references for GitHub Actions;
- least-privilege
GITHUB_TOKENpermissions; - protected
main,production, andnpmenvironments; - npm Trusted Publishing through OIDC instead of a long-lived npm token;
- private vulnerability reporting, Dependabot, secret scanning, and push protection where available;
- Toolkit validation, Antigravity native contract, CLI tests, web checks, Dependency Review, and production dependency audits before release;
- hands-on Antigravity smoke testing before a release PR leaves Draft.