fix(auth): narrow SessionExpired to confirmed OpenHuman backend 401s

app/src/services/__tests__/coreRpcClient.test.ts

@@ -666,6 +666,14 @@ describe('classifyRpcError', () => {
       undefined,
       'transport',
     ],
+    // Issue #2286: downstream provider 401s must NOT clear the user session.
+    [
+      'Discord API error: Discord list guilds failed (401): Unauthorized',
+      undefined,
+      'provider_auth',
+    ],
+    ['OpenAI API error (401 Unauthorized): invalid api key', undefined, 'provider_auth'],
+    ['Anthropic API error (401 Unauthorized): auth error', undefined, 'provider_auth'],
     ['some random message', undefined, 'unknown'],
   ] as const)('%s => %s', (message, status, expected) => {
     expect(classifyRpcError(message, status)).toBe(expected);

app/src/services/coreRpcClient.ts

@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ let resolvingCoreRpcToken: Promise<string | null> | null = null;
  */
 export type CoreRpcErrorKind =
   | 'auth_expired'
+  | 'provider_auth' // downstream provider 401 — NOT user session expiry
   | 'transport'
   | 'timeout'
   | 'rate_limited'
@@ -107,13 +108,41 @@ export function classifyRpcError(
   if (isThreadNotFoundRpcData(data)) return 'thread_not_found';
   if (httpStatus === 401) return 'auth_expired';
   if (httpStatus === 429) return 'rate_limited';
-  if (/\(401\b.*Unauthorized\)|Session expired/i.test(message)) return 'auth_expired';
+  // Confirmed OpenHuman session expiry — explicit markers from the backend/core.
+  if (/Session expired|SESSION_EXPIRED/i.test(message)) return 'auth_expired';
   // Core-side "no backend session token" → the auth profile is gone but the
   // frontend may still hold a stale sessionToken from an optimistic post-login
   // patch. Treat as auth-expired so `CoreStateProvider` clears the session and
   // `ProtectedRoute` bounces the user back to `/` (login) instead of trapping
   // them on an onboarding step that polls a failing RPC every 5 s.
   if (/no backend session token/i.test(message)) return 'auth_expired';
+  // "session JWT required" covers the case where a prior 401 already cleared
+  // the token and the very next RPC call finds no JWT in the store.
+  if (/session jwt required/i.test(message)) return 'auth_expired';
+  // OpenHuman backend path 401s (via authed_json): "{METHOD} /path failed (401 Unauthorized)"
+  // The HTTP method prefix distinguishes these from downstream provider 401s.
+  // Fix for issue #2286: only match when the message starts with an HTTP verb
+  // followed by a path — this excludes "Discord API error:", "OpenAI API error:", etc.
+  // HEAD and OPTIONS intentionally excluded — authed_json only uses these five verbs.
+  // Aligned with Rust is_session_expired_error: starts-with-verb check + separate
+  // contains checks for "401" and "unauthorized" (case-insensitive).
+  if (
+    /^(GET|POST|PUT|DELETE|PATCH)\s+\//.test(message) &&
+    /401/.test(message) &&
+    /unauthorized/i.test(message)
+  )
+    return 'auth_expired';
+  // Downstream provider/integration 401 — NOT user session expiry.
+  // e.g. "Discord API error: Discord list guilds failed (401): Unauthorized"
+  // e.g. "OpenAI API error (401 Unauthorized): invalid api key"
+  // e.g. "Composio v3 API error: HTTP 401: Unauthorized"
+  // Note: Discord uses "(401): Unauthorized" format (colon after status, reason outside parens),
+  // so we test for 401 and "unauthorized" independently rather than requiring both inside parens.
+  if (
+    (/401/.test(message) && /unauthorized/i.test(message)) ||
+    /invalid token|bad token/i.test(message)
+  )
+    return 'provider_auth';
   if (/429.*rate.?limit/i.test(message)) return 'rate_limited';
   if (/Budget exceeded|Insufficient budget/i.test(message)) return 'budget_exceeded';
   // Local AbortController hit `CORE_RPC_TIMEOUT_MS` — distinct from backend

src/core/jsonrpc.rs

@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ pub async fn invoke_method(state: AppState, method: &str, params: Value) -> Resu
     if let Err(ref msg) = result {
         if is_session_expired_error(msg) {
             log::warn!(
-                "[jsonrpc] backend returned 401 for method '{}' — publishing SessionExpired",
+                "[jsonrpc] confirmed session expiry for method='{}' — publishing SessionExpired",
                 method
             );
             // Scrub before publishing — subscribers log `reason`, and the
@@ -193,47 +193,90 @@ pub async fn invoke_method(state: AppState, method: &str, params: Value) -> Resu
                     reason: crate::openhuman::inference::provider::ops::sanitize_api_error(msg),
                 },
             );
+        } else if is_downstream_provider_auth_error(msg) {
+            let redacted = crate::openhuman::inference::provider::ops::sanitize_api_error(msg);
+            log::info!(
+                "[jsonrpc] downstream provider auth failure for method='{}' (not session expiry) — {}",
+                method,
+                redacted
+            );
         }
     }
 
     result
 }
 
-/// Helper to determine if an error message indicates an expired or invalid session.
+/// Helper to determine if an error message indicates an expired or invalid
+/// OpenHuman backend session.
+///
+/// **Narrower than the previous implementation** (fixed in issue #2286):
+///
+/// The old predicate matched ANY `"401 + unauthorized"` pattern, which caused
+/// downstream provider 401s (Discord bot token failures, BYO-key OpenAI /
+/// Anthropic failures, Composio direct-mode errors) to clear the user's session
+/// and log them out. The fix distinguishes between:
 ///
-/// Deliberately **looser** than
-/// [`crate::core::observability::is_session_expired_message`]: this
-/// dispatch-site predicate also matches the generic `"401 + unauthorized"` /
-/// `"invalid token"` pair so token cleanup +
-/// `DomainEvent::SessionExpired` publish fire on *any* 401, including
-/// BYO-key provider failures (which clear the stale local token even if
-/// the user mis-configured an OpenAI / Anthropic key). The strict
-/// classifier in `observability` is for the agent / web-channel
-/// `report_error_or_expected` call sites, where matching too loosely would
-/// silence actionable BYO-key configuration errors (OPENHUMAN-TAURI-26
-/// rationale: the agent-layer demote must NOT also swallow generic
-/// provider 401s).
+/// - **OpenHuman backend 401s** (`authed_json` in `src/api/rest.rs`): formatted
+///   as `"{METHOD} /path failed (401 Unauthorized): {body}"`, e.g.
+///   `"GET /teams failed (401 Unauthorized): {"success":false}"`. These always
+///   start with an HTTP method verb followed by a space and a forward slash.
+/// - **Provider / downstream 401s** (`api_error` in
+///   `src/openhuman/inference/provider/ops.rs`): formatted as
+///   `"{ProviderName} API error (401 Unauthorized): {body}"` or
+///   `"Discord API error: ... (401): Unauthorized"`. These start with a
+///   provider name, NOT an HTTP method verb.
 ///
-/// "No backend session token" is also treated as a session-expired signal: the
-/// auth profile is missing entirely (the user was never signed in, or their
-/// stored profile was wiped between login and the next RPC). The frontend may
-/// still believe it holds a session token from an optimistic post-login patch,
-/// so we want the same auto-cleanup + UI-level re-auth path to fire instead of
-/// repeatedly reporting this as a hard error to Sentry. See #1465-ish: users
-/// stuck on the onboarding `SkillsStep` would spam `composio_list_connections`
-/// failures every 5 s without ever being bounced back to the login screen.
+/// **What still triggers session expiry:**
+/// - `"Session expired"` — explicit body text from the OpenHuman backend.
+/// - `"no backend session token"` — pre-flight guard; auth profile is missing.
+/// - `"session jwt required"` — local guard; JWT already cleared by a prior 401.
+/// - `"SESSION_EXPIRED"` — scheduler-gate sentinel (exact case).
+/// - HTTP-method-prefixed 401s (`GET /`, `POST /`, etc.) — backend path format.
 ///
-/// "session JWT required" covers the case where a prior 401 already cleared the
-/// token and the very next RPC call (e.g. `channels_telegram_login_start`) finds
-/// no JWT in the store. This is the same auth-boundary condition, just surfaced
-/// as a local guard rather than a backend response.
+/// **What no longer triggers session expiry (fixed in #2286):**
+/// - Provider-prefixed 401s (`"Discord API error: ..."`, `"OpenAI API error ..."`)
+/// - `"invalid token"` — too broad; also matches Discord / OAuth provider tokens.
+///
+/// Note: for inference-path OpenHuman backend 401s, `api_error` (in
+/// `inference/provider/ops.rs` lines 479–497) ALREADY publishes `SessionExpired`
+/// directly, so there is no regression if this predicate misses them — the
+/// subscriber is idempotent and a harmless double-publish would still be correct.
 fn is_session_expired_error(msg: &str) -> bool {
     let lower = msg.to_lowercase();
-    (lower.contains("401") && lower.contains("unauthorized"))
-        || lower.contains("invalid token")
+    // Explicit session-expired markers from the OpenHuman backend / local guards.
+    if lower.contains("session expired")
         || lower.contains("no backend session token")
         || lower.contains("session jwt required")
         || msg.contains("SESSION_EXPIRED")
+    {
+        return true;
+    }
+    // OpenHuman backend path 401s via `authed_json`:
+    // format is "{METHOD} /path failed (401 Unauthorized): {body}"
+    // The HTTP-method prefix distinguishes these from provider-prefixed errors.
+    // HEAD and OPTIONS are intentionally excluded — `authed_json` only issues
+    // the five listed verbs (GET/POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH) for REST JSON endpoints.
+    if (lower.contains("401") && lower.contains("unauthorized"))
+        && (msg.starts_with("GET /")
+            || msg.starts_with("POST /")
+            || msg.starts_with("PUT /")
+            || msg.starts_with("DELETE /")
+            || msg.starts_with("PATCH /"))
+    {
+        return true;
+    }
+    false
+}
+
+/// Returns `true` when the error looks like a downstream provider / integration
+/// 401 that should NOT clear the user's OpenHuman session.
+///
+/// Used exclusively for diagnostic logging at the `invoke_method` call site so
+/// provider auth failures are visible in the logs without being misclassified
+/// as session expiry. Does not drive any side-effects.
+fn is_downstream_provider_auth_error(msg: &str) -> bool {
+    let lower = msg.to_lowercase();
+    lower.contains("401") && lower.contains("unauthorized")
 }
 
 /// Returns `true` when the error message comes from JSON-RPC params validation

src/core/jsonrpc_tests.rs

@@ -565,25 +565,86 @@ fn parse_json_params_reports_error_message() {
 
 #[test]
 fn is_session_expired_error_matches_401_unauthorized() {
+    // Issue #2286: only OpenHuman backend path 401s (HTTP-method prefix) should
+    // match, not generic 401/Unauthorized strings.
     assert!(is_session_expired_error(
+        "GET /teams failed (401 Unauthorized): {\"success\":false}"
+    ));
+    assert!(is_session_expired_error(
+        "POST /auth/token failed (401 Unauthorized): session expired"
+    ));
+    assert!(is_session_expired_error(
+        "DELETE /sessions/abc failed (401 Unauthorized): unauthorized"
+    ));
+    // Generic 401+unauthorized strings without HTTP-method prefix must NOT match.
+    assert!(!is_session_expired_error(
         "backend returned 401 Unauthorized"
     ));
-    assert!(is_session_expired_error("401 UNAUTHORIZED"));
-    assert!(is_session_expired_error("got 401 and unauthorized body"));
+    assert!(!is_session_expired_error("401 UNAUTHORIZED"));
+    assert!(!is_session_expired_error("got 401 and unauthorized body"));
 }
 
 #[test]
 fn is_session_expired_error_requires_both_401_and_unauthorized() {
     // 401 alone is not sufficient — could be HTTP/3.01 nonsense or
-    // unrelated text. We require the string "unauthorized" too.
+    // unrelated text. We require the string "unauthorized" too, plus HTTP-method
+    // prefix for the 401 path.
     assert!(!is_session_expired_error("server returned 401"));
     assert!(!is_session_expired_error("unauthorized without code"));
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn is_session_expired_error_matches_openhuman_backend_path_401() {
+    // OpenHuman backend calls via authed_json use the format:
+    // "{METHOD} /path failed (401 Unauthorized): {body}"
+    assert!(is_session_expired_error(
+        "GET /teams failed (401 Unauthorized): {\"success\":false}"
+    ));
+    assert!(is_session_expired_error(
+        "POST /auth/token failed (401 Unauthorized): session expired"
+    ));
+    assert!(is_session_expired_error(
+        "GET /teams/me/usage failed (401 Unauthorized): unauthorized"
+    ));
+    assert!(is_session_expired_error(
+        "PUT /profile failed (401 Unauthorized): token expired"
+    ));
+    assert!(is_session_expired_error(
+        "PATCH /settings failed (401 Unauthorized): unauthorized"
+    ));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn is_session_expired_error_does_not_match_discord_api_error() {
+    // Issue #2286: Discord bot token 401 must not clear the user session.
+    assert!(!is_session_expired_error(
+        "Discord API error: Discord list guilds failed (401): Unauthorized"
+    ));
+    assert!(!is_session_expired_error(
+        "Discord API error: Discord get bot user failed (401): bad token"
+    ));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn is_session_expired_error_does_not_match_byo_key_provider_401() {
+    // BYO-key provider 401 should not clear the user session.
+    assert!(!is_session_expired_error(
+        "OpenAI API error (401 Unauthorized): invalid api key"
+    ));
+    assert!(!is_session_expired_error(
+        "Anthropic API error (401 Unauthorized): authentication error"
+    ));
+    assert!(!is_session_expired_error(
+        "Composio v3 API error: HTTP 401: Unauthorized"
+    ));
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn is_session_expired_error_matches_invalid_token_case_insensitive() {
-    assert!(is_session_expired_error("Invalid Token"));
-    assert!(is_session_expired_error("got an invalid token here"));
+    // "invalid token" is no longer a session-expiry trigger (issue #2286):
+    // it was too broad and caught Discord/OAuth provider token errors.
+    assert!(!is_session_expired_error("Invalid Token"));
+    assert!(!is_session_expired_error("got an invalid token here"));
 }
 
 #[test]