| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| v1.5.x | ✅ Active |
| < v1.5.0 | ❌ No longer supported |
Do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
Report privately:
- Email: security@arleo.eu — include
[SECURITY]in the subject. - GitHub private advisory: use the Security Advisories feature.
Expected response: acknowledgement within 72 hours; fix timeline communicated within 7 days.
This project is a local-only homelab control-plane. It is not a SaaS product. The threat model assumes:
- The operator controls the host.
- The operator UI listens on
127.0.0.1:9091by default and is not exposed to the internet. - The encrypted CredentialStore (SQLite AES-GCM, per-secret) is the only authorised secret storage path.
- No secrets in environment files, YAML config, logs, or generated documentation.
- CSRF bypass on admin routes.
- Secret leakage in HTTP responses, logs, or audit trail.
- SQLite CredentialStore encryption bypass.
- Authentication bypass on the operator UI.
- Command injection via config or user-controlled inputs.
- The operator UI is accessible while logged in (by design).
- Secrets visible to the root user on the local machine (out of scope — physical access).
- Theoretical attacks requiring an already-compromised host account with write access to the state directory.
Do not paste API tokens, LAPI keys, Cloudflare tokens, or any credential values in GitHub issues, pull requests, or comments. Rotate any credential you accidentally expose immediately.
We follow responsible disclosure. We will credit reporters in the release notes unless they request anonymity.