fix(security): prevent command injection in MCP tools - #15963
Open
alifakbxr wants to merge 1 commit into
Open
Conversation
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
1 participant
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
The
infra/experimental/mcp/oss_fuzz_server.pyandinfra/experimental/mcp/client.pyfiles construct shell commands using string concatenation with external inputs (like project names and repository URLs) and execute them usingsubprocess.check_callwithshell=True. This introduces command injection vulnerabilities, which could allow arbitrary command execution on the host machine running the MCP server or client.This patch migrates these
subprocess.check_callinvocations to use explicit argument lists instead of raw strings, and removes theshell=Trueparameter. By doing so, Python passes arguments directly to the subprocess API, preventing the system shell from evaluating shell metacharacters within the variable contents.