fix: encrypt exchange account credentials at rest - #153
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apiKey, secretKey and password on ExchangeAccount were stored as plaintext in the database. Anyone with read access to the SQLite/ Postgres file (or a backup of it) could read every configured exchange API key in the clear. This adds transparent AES-256-GCM encryption/decryption at the single choke point where exchange accounts are read/written (the `xprisma` Prisma Client extension), so every existing caller of `xprisma.exchangeAccount.*` keeps working unchanged with plaintext values in memory, while the DB itself only ever stores ciphertext. The encryption key is kept separate from the database: either an operator-supplied CREDENTIALS_ENCRYPTION_KEY env var, or an auto-generated key persisted to ~/.opentrader/credentials.key (0600) on first run. This means a leaked DB file/backup alone is not enough to recover stored credentials. Backwards compatible: existing plaintext rows are detected (no "enc:v1:" prefix) and passed through as-is on read, and get encrypted the next time they're written.
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apiKey, secretKey and password on ExchangeAccount were stored as plaintext in the database. Anyone with read access to the SQLite/ Postgres file (or a backup of it) could read every configured exchange API key in the clear.
This adds transparent AES-256-GCM encryption/decryption at the single choke point where exchange accounts are read/written (the
xprismaPrisma Client extension), so every existing caller ofxprisma.exchangeAccount.*keeps working unchanged with plaintext values in memory, while the DB itself only ever stores ciphertext.The encryption key is kept separate from the database: either an operator-supplied CREDENTIALS_ENCRYPTION_KEY env var, or an auto-generated key persisted to ~/.opentrader/credentials.key (0600) on first run. This means a leaked DB file/backup alone is not enough to recover stored credentials.
Backwards compatible: existing plaintext rows are detected (no "enc:v1:" prefix) and passed through as-is on read, and get encrypted the next time they're written.